It’s crazy how extremely solid founders who are clearly executing really well still end up being fairly non-consensus when being evaluated by new investors in the first few rounds.
In my experience, this happens due to one or more of the following reasons:
(1) The founder is still learning the art of effective pitching/story-telling. Therefore, the quality of the opportunity isn’t being adequately communicated in the pitch. [Frequently the case with technical founders in deeptech].
(2) Details around the exact addressable market are still fuzzy. So unless an institutional investor has a pre-prepared mind for that particular space, they struggle to build conviction around it. [Eg. people passing on Zepto Series A & B].
(3) Even with awesome growth & metrics, the target market is simply out of favor at the moment with investors due to recent history or macro headwinds. [Eg. anything related to edtech in India at the moment].
(4) A multitude of internal issues at a VC firm that have nothing to do with the company. [Eg., bad history with previous investments in the space, already over-exposed to the sector, not having enough dry powder, deal sponsor is not a GP/ lacks internal political capital to push it through etc. etc.]
This is where existing investors in the company, particularly those who have been spending enough time with the founder and have been tracking execution closely enough to be able to accurately judge the slope of the team/business, have a massive information asymmetry advantage.
This creates valuable opportunities for insiders to build ownership at attractive valuations while the market struggles to build a firm POV.
As an existing investor, the key is to take a step back, block out the noise and distractions from external signals, and do a fresh, rigorous underwriting from the ground up as a new deal, while keeping emotional biases at bay (commitment bias, consistency bias, throwing good money after bad, etc.).
As long as you can be intellectually honest in this new underwriting process, the superior quality & trendline of signals gathered while being on the cap table will work massively in your favor, both in terms of allocating more to the right companies, as well as avoiding the landmines that look like goldmines to new investors!
The key risk in all doubling-down decisions is “your own sh*t always smells sweet to you”. So, keeping a significantly high & tight bar for what goes through, as well as having some fund-level guardrails (% of fund caps for reserves & cross-fund deals) will hopefully help counterbalance the human biases.